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The warm and friendly Ethio-Sudan diplomatic relations that followed Sudan’s 
independence in 1956 and the long standing frontier trade between the two countries have 
been severely damaged by the outbreak of civil wars in southern Sudan in 1955 as well as 
in Eritrea in 1962. As the civil wars intensified in both countries, the influx of refugees and 
insurgents across their common border took place. Internal political and socio-economic 
problems in Ethiopia and the Sudan, together with super-power rivalries in the Horn 
brought about periods of increasing hostilities between the two countries. On a tit for tat 
basis, both the Imperial and military governments of Ethiopia and the successive 
governments of the Sudan came to encourage and assist cross-border guerrilla forces from 
either side. Thus, animosity rather than cooperation characterized relations between the 
Sudan and Ethiopia until the fall of the Derg in 1991. 
 





The Upper Nile and Jonglei regions of Southern Sudan bordering Gambella and the 
Gambella region itself were intensively affected by the wars between the governments of 
the Sudan and the Anyanya I (the southern Sudan Guerilla group in the first civil war 1955-
1972), the SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army of the second civil war 1983-2005), the 
Lou-Jikany conflict (1993-1994), the armed conflicts following the splits within the 
SPLM/A and the South Sudan Independence Movement Army (SSIM/A) 1991-2005). The 
Sudan governments claimed that Ethiopia was supporting the South Sudan guerrillas 
struggling to secede from the north while the governments of Ethiopia accused successive 
Sudanese governments of material and moral support to the Eritrean secessionist 
movements.  
                                                 
∗ Assistant Professor, College of Commerce, Addis Ababa University 
 Ragassa Bayissa    
 
 20
The military government of Ethiopia (the Derg) accused the Sudan of supporting the 
insurgents of northern Ethiopia and of its hostile policies towards the Ethiopian revolution 
and national unity. The Derg provided the SPLA with substantial military and logistical 
support in its struggle against the Khartoum regime which hosted the opposition 
movements from Ethiopia.  It also provided the SPLM/A with supply routes, training 
facilities, a radio station, and sites for the establishment of refugee camps in the Gambella 
region ran by the UNHCR. The SPLA repaid the assistance from Ethiopia by fighting 
proxy wars for the Derg against the OLF (the Oromo Liberation Front) and the GPLM (the 
Gambella People’s Liberation Movement). Both movements were based in the Sudan and 
launched guerrilla wars against the Derg and SPLA from the Upper Nile and Blue Nile. 
Similarly the Sudan Government used the Ethiopian opposition groups in fighting the 
SPLA in Gambella. The Akobo and Jikawo border districts of Gambella were under 
continuous attacks from the GPLM and the Sudanese armed forces. Moreover, the 
Sudanese army had also supported the 1989-90 EPLF-OLF coordinated invasion and 
prolonged occupation of Assosa. These regional conflicts and proxy wars brought about 
further violence and deterioration of economic, social and political conditions of the Ethio-
Sudan communities.  
The Derg played an important role in the establishment of the SPLM/A which it 
logistically and militarily supported and used against its opposition groups operating from 
the Sudan. Ethiopia and the Sudan used internal conflicts to fulfill their own strategic 
objectives. These conflicts have adversely influenced their relations and intensified the 
misery and suffering of their peoples. The data for this research was based on military 
intelligence reports of the archives of the Ministry of Defence, secondary sources and oral 
information collected during my fieldworks in Gambella as part of my PhD research from 
2005 to 2009. 
 
The Foundation of SPLM/A in the Gambella Region   
     
President Numeiri’s abrogation of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement was the main cause 
for the rise of the SPLM/A and the eruption of the second civil war in southern Sudan. In 
1983 Numeiri’s regime destroyed the Southern Regional Government and Assembly and 
divided the region into three provinces. The government also declared the policy of 
transferring the Anya Nya guerilla forces which had been integrated into the national army 
to the North while the Addis Ababa Agreement stipulated that they were to serve only in 
the South. The southern battalions stationed at Akobo, Bor, Pibor, Pachalla and other 
garrisons revolted against the new policies of the government. The imposition of the 
Islamic Laws further led to widespread opposition and desertions in Bor, Pibor and 
Pachalla garrisons led by famous commanders such as Major Karubino Kuanyin, Captain 
David Reik, Major William Nyuon, Lieutenant Vincent Kuany and Corporal Bol Kur who 
joined the exodus of thousands of refugees from Upper Nile and Jonglie to the bordering 
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Gambella region of Ethiopia. In response to the abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement 
and repressive measures of the government, the South Sudanese of different walks of life 
joined the liberation struggle and according to Peter A. Nyaba (1997: 54) they: 
 
…trekked all the way to the Ethiopian borders where the first SPLM/A camps 
were established. Even. the question of the name of the Movement, its political 
direction and leadership were only  resolved after the arrival in western 
Ethiopia of the politicians, military  officers and men, students,  farmers, cattle 
herders, workers and others, who comprised the rank and file the movement. 
 
There were some Anya Nya officers who resisted the Addis Ababa Agreement and 
remained in Ethiopia. These officers formed the Anya Nya II group known as the Sudan 
People’s Revolutionary party (SPRP) composed of ex-Anya Nya Nuer, who negotiated 
some funds from Libya with Ethiopian help. The Anya Nya II groups operating in South 
Sudan gained support from the Southern soldiers and civilians (Johnson 2003: 84). The 
inundation of the Gambella region by armed mutinous, southern forces from South Sudan 
was a serious security concern for Ethiopia. From 10-18 June 1983, the committee of high 
level Derg officials led by Fisseha Desta toured the border districts of Gambella region by 
helicopter with the main objective of bringing together the refugees scattered all over the 
border districts of Gambella and put them in refugee camps. For this goal the Ethiopian 
officials searched for the mutinous army officers who took refuge in Gambella so that they 
could help them to organize the refugees into residential camps. The officials also wanted 
to know the conditions in South Sudan which forced thousands of Sudanese to migrate to 
Gambella. The members of the committee visited Itang, Belpam, Adura, Jikawo and 
Akobo. In Itang the committee met the South Sudanese refugees and was informed that it 
was Dr. Colonel John Garang who could give a detailed explanation of the problem in 
South Sudan in general and the refugee issues in particular. The committee members went 
to Adura and picked Dr. Colonel John Garang Mabior, a Dinka intellectual, Akwot Atem, a 
Dinka veteran, Samuel Gai Tut, a Nuer Anya Nya officer, Captain Salva Kiir who was a 
Dinka security officer in Malakal,  William Chul Deng, and Bol Kur as influential refugee 
leaders and returned to Gambella town.1 
In Gambella the Ethiopian officials and the aforementioned South Sudanese refugee 
leaders and officials of the Southern Regional Government, met for three days and 
discussed different issues in relation to the South Sudanese insurgency. The issues 
predominantly revolved around: the causes of the current South Sudanese revolt, the 
previous revolts and their failure, and relations between the present movement and other 
opposition groups in the Sudan. The Ethiopian officials also wanted to know the political 
agenda of the mutinous army officers and South Sudanese government officials in their 
opposition to the Khartoum regime, and indicated that the arrival of such a huge number of 
armed officers and soldiers into the Gambella region of Ethiopia was a violation of 
international border and international law. The Ethiopian officials also requested the South 
Sudanese refugee leaders to identify the number of South Sudanese refugees and their 
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locations in Gambella. The refugee leaders were told to indicate the number and kinds of 
weapons in the hands of the refugees; and to report their political objectives, and whether 
they have a political movement (party) or not.2 
In their response to the Ethiopian officials’ questions the refugee leaders explained 
that the root causes of the movement were oppression and exploitation of the various 
nationalities of the Sudan by successive regimes from Khartoum. According to these 
leaders, the violation of the Addis Ababa Agreement, the encroachment of the regime on 
the main economic resources of the south (oil, water and agricultural lands), the integration 
agreement and joint defense treaty with Egypt without consultation and participation of the 
people of South Sudan and the policy of transferring to the north of the absorbed Anya Nya 
I guerrillas, which precipitated the May uprising, (but the Addis Ababa Agreement 
stipulated that they were to serve only in the South), were mentioned as the main factors 
that led to the southern insurrection and the second civil war. The leaders of the movement 
also identified that their ideology was to establish a ‘United Socialist, New Sudan’, not a 
separate independent South Sudan.3 The movement sought to obtain intellectual, moral, 
military and other material assistance from the socialist countries like Ethiopia sympathetic 
to the aims and objectives of the movement. The high level Ethiopian officials questioned 
the rebel leaders on the atrocities and lack of discipline of the South Sudanese refugees in 
Gambella, which the memo of the Ministry of Defence stated as follows: 
 
Your refugees in Ethiopia were not properly registered in accordance with the 
UN regulations, they violate Ethiopian law, they plunder (the local people), they 
interfere in (the local) administration. What is your opinion about this? 
(Answer) We have already heard the plundering and illegal activities of the 
refugees, and we are disappointed. A man would not have destroyed his own 
house. We consider these people as destroyers of their own houses. All these 
deeds are the outcome of lack of awareness. We will correct…The Ethiopian 
problem is our problem. Soon we will separate the fighting forces from the aid- 
receiving refugees. Give us directives and we will implement them…4 
 
The Anya Nya I had military training bases at Jikawo, Itang, Belpam and Teilet until 
the Addis Ababa Agreement which was known to the government of the Sudan. The 
Ethiopian officials suggested that for the new movement proper leadership should be 
created and its base to be established in the interior away from possible threat of the 
Sudanese army and security.5 The prominent refugee leaders who met and discussed with 
                                                 
 2MOND, .131, Minutes of Conference of Ethiopian officials with South Sudanese refugee 
leaders. 
3MOND, .131, Minutes of Conference of Ethiopian Officials and South Sudanese Refugee 
Leaders in Gambella, 22 April 1983, Informants  David Odoro, Cham Ujulu. David is an Anuak of 
Gambella and was governor of Itang district who witnessed the SPLA activities and atrocities in 
Gambella region.  
4Ibid.  
5 Ibid. 
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the Ethiopian officials at Gambella asked for some weapons to defend themselves, basic 
needs for maintenance, education for children of refugees and they suggested that their 
leader, John Garang to present himself secretly to Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam and 
receive directives and encouragement. The Ethiopian officials positively responded to these 
requests and all the five leaders of the new movement were brought to Addis Ababa for 
political orientation. Women, children and the elderly refugees were to be registered and 
assisted by the UN agencies in refugee camps which would reduce the burden of the 
government and the local population. They also agreed that the young male refugees were 
to be recruited for guerrilla force and military training camps were to be prepared in the 
interior away from the common border.6  
Thus the leadership of the clandestine cell of the new South Sudanese Movement 
came into being during the 18-26 June 1983 high level Ethiopian officials’ meeting with 
the influential South Sudanese refugee leaders in Gambella. The five leaders served in 
different government structures, and had different political views on the problem of South 
Sudan. Akwot Atem was one of the guerrilla leaders operating from Ethiopia who did not 
accept the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. Three former Anya Nya officers who had 
served together in the Upper Nile, namely, Colonel John Garang, head of the Staff College 
in Omdurman, retired Major William Abdellah Chuol and Samuel Gai Tut, a minister in 
the interim Southern Regional Government (in 1982), made contact with Akwot Atem. 
Another ex-Anya Nya officer, Major Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, had been engaged in fighting 
Anya Nya II, also made contacts with them before the events of May 1983 in Bor (Johnson 
2003: 60). 
During their stay in Addis Ababa the leaders of the new movement made a division of 
labor among themselves; accordingly, Akwot Atem became Chairman; John Garang, a 
military organizer; and Samuel Gai Tut and Joseph Ahur Ujio members of the Political 
Council. They named the new movement as the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement 
(SPLM), and the military wing of the movement as the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army 
(SPLA). They prepared a manifesto of the movement and declared socialism to be their 
ideology. The manifesto of the emerging SPLM/SPLA made a blow to the northern elite’s 
accusations against the southerners, that they were separatists. In the Manifesto of the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement of 31 July 1983, the SPLA/SPLM leaders stated: “It 
must be reiterated that the principal objective of the SPLA/SPLM is not separation of the 
South. Africa has been fragmented sufficiently enough by colonialism and neocolonialism 
and its further fragmentation can only be to the interest of her enemies.”7 As to why the 
liberation movement for the whole of Sudan originated in South Sudan and by southern 
Sudanese political and military leaders, John Garang, chairman and commander-in-chief of 
the SPLA/SPLM made the following remarks in his first official appeal to the Sudanese 
people: 
 
                                                 
6Informants David Odoro, Cham Ujulu. (07 February 2007). 
7John Garang de Mabior, Manifesto of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, July 31, 1983, 
Cited in Elias Nyamlell Wakoson, The Sudanese Dilemma: The South-North Conflict, Northeast 
African Studies, Volume 9, Number 3, 1987, 43-58.  
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The burden and incidence of neglect and oppression by successive Khartoum 
clique regimes had traditionally fallen more on the South than on other parts of 
the country. Under these circumstances, the marginal cost of rebellion in the 
South became very small, zero or negative; that is, in the South it pays to 
rebel….(the clique in Khartoum)…has openly aggressed and agitated Southern 
Sudanese into rebellion  and civil war….it is clear and natural that a Vanguard 
Movement for the liberation of the whole Sudanese people had to have its 
origins in South Sudan. Any armed struggle must have as its point of    
departure the immediate and genuine needs and demands of the masses of the 
people.8 
 
On their return to Gambella, the SPLM/A leaders were given directives by the 
Ethiopian authorities to execute the responsibilities given to them. The refugees were 
settled at Itang, Belpam and Rukedy camps and were briefed on the objectives of the 
movement by their leaders. Competent individuals from the refugees were assigned into the 
designed political and military structure of the movement. The leaders prepared criteria of 
registration and recruitment for the fighting force of the movement. They were given 
directives to set up a recruitment committee for the training of guerrilla forces.9 
 
 
The Early SPLM/A Leadership Crisis 
The military government of Ethiopia (the Derg) which accused the Sudan of supporting the 
insurgents of northern Ethiopia and of its hostile policies towards the Ethiopian revolution 
decided to use the southern Sudanese opposition to topple Numeiri’s regime. Therefore, the 
Ethiopian officials were very eager to see the beginning of training of the fighting forces 
and the first SPLM/A leaders had gathered the refugees and briefed them about the 
movement, its program and manifesto from 16-18 August 1983. There was a long delay of 
the recruitment because of the rise of apparent power struggle over leadership of the 
emerging movement between Akwot Atem and John Garang.10 Garang was arming Akot 
Atem, the prominent Anya Nya II commander operating from Ethiopia, through the two 
Anya Nya II Nuer officers, Samuel Gai Tut and William Abdallah Chuol. The mutinous 
officers of 1983, Kerubino Kuanyin Bol (a Dinka) and William Nyuon Bany (a Nuer) 
preferred John Garang for the leadership to the two Anya Nya II officers. The older Anya 
Nya commanders, Samuel Gai Tut and Akot Atem, however, felt that their former seniority 
over Garang should be retained. They also preferred the separation of the military from the 
political wing of the movement and proposed Gai Tut as the head of the military wing and 
                                                 
8John Garang de Mabior, Appeal to the Sudanese People on the Founding of the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, (1983) Cited in Elias N. 
Wakoson, The Sudanese Dilemma, The South – North Conflict, Northeast African Studies, Volume 9, 
Number 3, 1987, 43-58. 
9MOND, .131, 22 April 1983. Minutes of Conference.  
10MOND, .131, 22 April 1983. Minutes of Conference, Informants, David Odoro, Cham Ujulu, 
Captain Bekele Baddadda.  
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Akot Atem as the head of the political wing. They offered the post of deputy commander to 
Garang (Johnson 2003 65). 
On 24 August 1983 sixty refugee representatives from Itang, Belpam and Rukedy 
refugee camps formed a committee to elect the chairman of the SPLM/A under the 
leadership of William Chuol Deng. Akwot Atem and Samuel Gai Tut were identified as 
candidates. But Samuel Gai declined the candidacy and Akwot Atem was elected without a 
contender. Immediately after the election Akwot Atem gave appointments. Samuel Gai Tut 
was assigned as the head of the military committee of the movement, the position 
previously given to John Garang, who was now posted as the chief of staff of the SPLA; 
Joseph Oduho, the head of the foreign affairs and Martin Majic the head of the judiciary.11 
The election and the appointment severely divided the leadership of the emerging 
movement into two opposing groups. John Garang refused to accept the vague position of 
chief of staff of the SPLA given to him as well as the result of the election.12 
In July 1983 the Ethiopian Military Government set up an ad-hoc committee at the 
centre to resolve the problem within the leadership of the SPLM/A in cooperation with the 
regional and local officials of Illu Ababor and Gambella. The committee made several 
visits to Gambella. The committee believed that there was no need for Akwot Atem to 
arrange the election of the leader of the movement by the refugee population because at the 
meeting with the refugees, there was no opposition to his leadership. The refugee 
representatives from different refugee camps in Itang and Belpam had unanimously 
accepted the manifesto and program of the movement. Therefore, the government 
committee had increasingly become skeptical of the re-election of Akwot Atem. Finally, 
after the committee discovered that the objective of electing the leader by the refugees was 
to legitimize and strengthen the power of Akot Atem.13 
Akwot Atem and Samuel Gai Tut who were long time close friends with similar 
political views grew anxious of the increasing popularity of John Garang. Garang was not 
only a man of higher academic and military training but was also believed to have founded 
the clandestine cell of the emerging movement in the Sudan’s armed forces. His radical 
principles in the manifesto and program of the new movement appeared to be a serious 
threat to the future power positions of the Anya Nya old guards. Furthermore, Akwot Atem 
sought the support of the majority Nuer refugee population in Itang and Belpam through 
his Nuer friend, Colonel Samuel Gai Tut. The local government officials of Gambella 
Awraja (the administrator, the head of the Public Security and the commanding officer of 
the Gambella military garrison) reported to the higher authorities that the five leaders of the 
SPLM/A were requested to meet and draft a work plan to execute the program of the 
movement. But the leaders could not agree to meet because of serious divisions among 
them and informed the regional officials to report the problem to the higher officials. On 27 
                                                 
11 The last two did not accept the appointment. 
12MOND, .492, Report on the Crisis of Leadership in South Sudanese Movement, 30 August 
1983. 
13Informants: David Odoro, Tuwol Okelo, Ujun Ujulu ( 07 February 2007),  MOND, .492, Report 
on the Crisis of Leadership in South Sudanese Movement, 30 August 1983.  
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August 1983 the team of Illu Ababor Regional and Gambella Awraja officials left for Itang 
to investigate and end the divisions.14 
 The team of Ethiopian officials and the SPLM/A leadership met and discussed issues 
of resolving the problem of the leadership by democratic means. The main focus of their 
discussion was on power sharing in leadership of the movement, particularly whom to 
assign to lead the SPLA, the military wing of the movement. The committee requested 
Colonel Samuel Gai Tut to resign from the leadership of the military committee and accept 
the position of the vice-chairman and the head of the administrative committee of the 
movement. This was an attempt to bring back John Garang to the chairmanship of the 
military committee. But Samuel Gai Tut refused to accept any other position except the 
leadership of the military wing of the movement. The joint meeting of the Ethiopian 
officials and the SPLM/A leaders reached an agreement that Akwot Atem should remain 
the chairman of the movement. But the question of the military committee head and the 
commander of the SPLA remained unresolved. Akwot Atem continued to defend the 
appointment of Samuel Gai Tut as the organizer of the military committee. He argued that 
Samuel Gai Tut was a long time, well known and strong military leader, and his Nuer 
origin was very important because they had planned first to liberate the Upper Nile, the 
region with the majority of the Nuer population.15 
  
The Rise of John Garang as Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the 
SPLM/A 
To make further investigation and to solve the leadership problems of the South Sudanese 
movement, the aforementioned government committee selected fourteen popular 
personalities from the refugees to collect more information. Accordingly, three military 
officers, four refugee camp leaders, four highly experienced ex-officials, and three people 
of higher education were picked to find a solution of the leadership crisis. Thirteen people 
favored John Garang for the leadership of the movement, while the remaining four 
supported Akwot Atem. John Garang was supported by educated officers and most refugee 
leaders. The opponents of John Garang accused him of representing only the Dinka 
interests and of being a CIA agent sent by President Numeiri to eliminate the movement 
and has come to divert the orientation of the movement to western capitalism because he 
was educated in the USA.16 
Among the prominent personalities who forwarded their opinions was Martin Majic, 
the Dinka lawyer who suggested that for the political leadership of the movement, people 
should be identified and given political training in Ethiopia and Garang should be given the 
post of military leadership and he should start recruitment and training of the fighting 
forces. Another important figure was Major Kerbino Kuanyin, who explained that the 
program of the new movement was drafted by John Garang. The investigation committee 
concluded that there was a disparity of political orientation between the different groups, 
                                                 
14Informants: Samuel Gilo, David Odoro.Cham Gutlak. (08 February 2007) 
15MOND, .492, Report on the Crisis of Leadership in South Sudanese Movement, 30  
.August 1983. 
16Informants: Kuwot Utuwo, David Malwal. (Februay 08, 2007). 
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mainly between the Anya Nya II leaders and the progressive individuals organized around 
John Garang and therefore it recommended that they should be taken to Addis Ababa for 
political education. The committee reported to the Derg Office that the urgent task was the 
recruitment, training and organizing of the fighting forces. The regional officials 
anticipated that the lack of unity among the refugees, particularly the growing tension and 
hostility among the armed groups of refugees led by rival leaders might escalate to 
factional fighting and endanger the security of the Gambella region. They strongly 
recommended forging unity of the south Sudanese refugees under one leadership and to 
speed up the creation of a fighting force. The tasks and responsibilities of the various 
committees indicated in the program of the movement were to be clearly identified and 
handled by competent people.17 
 Nevertheless, the attempt to forge a common forum was frustrated, because Akot 
Atem and Samuel Gai Tut, as the senior officers of the Nnya Nya were anxious of the 
rising popularity of John Garang, who was the Anya Nya junior officer. Hence each leader 
gathered supporters and sought Ethiopian endorsement. These maneuvers ended in 
bloodshed, followed by the withdrawal of Anya Nya II forces and their prominent leaders 
back into the Sudan. John Garang emerged as the leader of the SPLM/A. Garang’s 
charismatic disposition, radical political views and sound academic and military 
background greatly attracted the attention of the Ethiopian officials. Therefore, with the 
support of the Ethiopian government Garang began to openly oppose every activity of his 
rival Anya Nya II leaders in Itang. According to Major Samuel Gai Tut, “…it became clear 
later on that he (Garang) did not do this alone but had initially the implicit and eventually 
the explicit support of the Ethiopian government.”18 
The Derg imposed unity on the different groups in south Sudan that sought its shelter 
and support, and backed John Garang as the leader of the new movement who, according to 
Peter Wood, “…combined ideological and military leadership in a way unprecedented in 
Sudanese politics since Mohamed Ahmed el-Mahdi in the nineteenth century.” (Woodward 
2003: 97) Ethiopia quickly supported Garang’s view of a radically changed, united ‘New 
Sudan’ rather than the old Anya Nya struggle for the secession of the South, a position 
suitable for the regime in Ethiopia which was fighting against the northern secessionist 
movements (Johnson 2003: 64). 
The Anya Nya II leaders, including Akwot Atem and Samuel Gai Tut were told by the 
Ethiopian officials to integrate their forces into the forces of John Garang. The Ethiopian 
army in charge of the south Sudanese refugees in the Gambella region moved to Itang to 
execute the order. Akwot Atem, Samuel Gai Tut and other Anya Nya II leaders were 
overwhelmed and had no choice but to withdraw from Itang to Tiergot, the border territory 
in Gambella. Later on they contacted the Ethiopian authorities at Tiergot and made a last 
attempt to come back to Itang to bring about a dialogue for reconciliation and unity 
between their faction and that of John Garang. Their attempt failed because Garang who 
was confident of Ethiopian support ignored reconciliation and fierce factional fighting 
followed thereafter. The followers of Garang, with the support of the Ethiopian army 
                                                 
17Informants: Alemayehu Chekol, David Odoro, Cham Gutlak. (08 February 2007). 
18MOND, ..492, Samul Gai Tut “Statement to All Sudanese”. 
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invaded Belpam, the headquarters of Anya Nya II, and defeated the supporters of Samuel 
Gai Tut, Akwot Atem and William Abdella Chuol, and many people were killed.19 
According to Sharon Hutchinson, “Forging tight alliance with Mengistu, Garang adopted 
the heavy-handed militarism and autocratic leadership style of his Soviet-supported hosts. 
He proceeded to hunt down his Anya Nya II rivals, who swiftly fled back to Sudan….”On 
the other hand quickly supporting Garang’s view of a radically changed, united ‘New 
Sudan’ and “fighting his own war against secessionist rebels in Eritrea and Tigray, 
Mengistu could hardly have been expected to support the main political objective of the 
Anyanya II.”(Hutchinson 2001: 307-331). 
In March 1984 the officials of Illu Ababor Region decided that the Anya Nya II 
leaders and their followers had to hand over their weapon to John Garang or to the 
Ethiopian authorities. But the defiant Anya Nya II leaders retreated to their bases in the 
Sudan. The failure of further attempts at reconciliation and the killing of Samuel Gai Tut in 
March 1984 by Kerubino’s forces on the border while trying to come to Ethiopia to 
negotiate with the SPLM/A led to an alliance of Anya Nya II with Numeiri (Johnson 2001: 
7). According to Nyaba, when the SPLM/A raised the façade of a ‘United Socialist Sudan’ 
as its objectives, “…it found a ready and willing ally in Ethiopia”. The Ethiopian 
authorities were from the very beginning interested in supporting armed resistance against 
the Khartoum regime, and the emergence of the SPLA blended well into their strategic 
calculations. The support given by the Ethiopian regime to the military officers, and the 
subsequent rise of a political military High Command, the highest organ of the SPLM/A, 
comprising solely former military officers of the Sudanese army indicated the militarist 
trend the Ethiopian regime had wanted the infant movement to follow. This sowed the 
seeds of division and dichotomy between the military officers and the politicians and the 
intellectuals in general, who came to Ethiopia to join the armed struggle. They were 
ignored, marginalized and persecuted and branded as ‘bourgeois’, the potential or real 
enemies of the people. The Ethiopian officials and some South Sudanese looked for a 
competent military officer to lead the armed struggle in south Sudan. John Garang’s 
academic and military credentials combined to make him the best qualified and suitable 
candidate for the leadership of the SPLM/A (Nyaba 1997: 34-5) However, Nyaba argued 
that the considerable role of the Derg on the establishment of the SPLM/A and the 
dependence of the Movement on the Ethiopian material and military support was more of a 
liability than an asset for the Movement (Nyaba 1997: 33) 
 
Whatever the assistance rendered to the infant movement, the involvement of the 
Ethiopian regime in the affairs of the SPLM/A from the very beginning seriously 
injured and distorted its growth and development. It prevented the emergence of 
an internal political and democratic culture nurtured by internal political 
debate and ideological struggle that could have cleansed the infant movement 
and its combatants of the filth of the ‘old Sudan’. 
 
                                                 
19MOND, .492, Report of Leadership Crisis in South Sudanese Movement, 30 August 1983, Peter 
Armound Nyaba, The Politics of Liberation, p.34. 
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Personal relations between Mengistu and John Garang and the SPLM/A’s close 
association with the pro-Soviet Derg regime was used in the propaganda of the Khartoum 
regime to brand the movement as a communist and to get support from the Arab countries. 
However, the supply of immense military and logistical support to the SPLA by the Derg 
and the use of a strategic Gambella rear base played decisive role in the military advances 
of the movement in the 1980s.  
 
 
The Derg’s Military and Logistical Assistance to SPLA 
 
The Ethiopian military government’s all rounded support to the SPLM/A in order to 
weaken the Numeiri regime and the opposition movements in the Sudan had strengthened 
the military muscle of the SPLM/A which gradually enabled it to control different groups 
in southern Sudan. The archives of the Ministry of National Defense clearly indicated that 
the SPLA led by Garang was from the very beginning under close leadership, supervision 
and support of the Ministry of National Defense of Ethiopia. Among other things, the 
Ministry of National Defense Archives revealed that the Ethiopian military officials had 
planned and participated in the SPLA’s war strategy in South Sudan: 
  
With the close leadership and support of Comrade (Defense) Minister within a 
short period the 07 Project (the SPLA) has become a well known movement. The 
First Division is trained and armed. It is establishing a base in South Sudan and 
ready for combat. The Second Division will complete its training after four 
weeks and will be deployed. The Third Division is under preparation to enter the 
training camp….Conditions are getting favorable since community leaders, 
soldiers and students are traveling  long journey and coming to join the SPLA…. 
South Sudan is a vast territory with a scattered armed struggle. This condition 
compelled the division of South Sudan into six operational zones. It has become 
necessary to deploy forces into the different zones and to closely follow, lead 
and control conditions for military operation.20 
 
The Ethiopian assistance was not limited to the supply of fuel, provisions, medicine 
and logistics only, but the well qualified Ethiopian officers and Air Borne commandos also 
provided intensive military training for thousands of SPLA guerrilla fighters at different 
SPLA military camps in western Ethiopia. A memo of the archives of the Ministry of 
Defense reads: 
 
Within a year of its establishment, (SPLA) has scored a significant achievement 
in crushing Numeiri’s forces in south Sudan. Generally it is supported by 
Ethiopia and Libya gave some assistance in weapons. So far 20,000 fighting 
forces were trained by selected members of the Air Borne Division and 7000 of 
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them are waiting for weapons to join the fighting force. In addition, by the order 
from the higher authority, 400 cadets participated in the training of officers. 20 
of them were dismissed because of low performance and disciplinary reasons, 
while the 380 had completed the officers’ course and graduated on September 
23, 1984.21 
 
In his SPLM/SPLA military and political program for the year May 1987 to May 
1988, Col. Dr. John Garang de Mabior, Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of 
SPLM/SPLA presented detailed logistical and other necessary material support requests to 
the Derg government. Garang’s list of request included armament (varieties of weapons), 
ammunitions, hand grenades and anti-personnel mines, uniforms, food, tracked bridge 
vehicles, sufficient quantities of fuel, oil and lubricants, communication radios and trucks. 
These material requirements were for thousands of trained SPLA forces to capture the six 
garrisons of  Kapoeta, Torit, Bor, Mangalla, Akobo and Nasir; and to open new fronts in 
the North (Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile), and in the South (Western 
Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal). Logistical support request was also made to 
capture Kurmuk, “…for eventual attacks on Damazin and dislodge the OLF bandits from 
the area….” On 27 June 1987 Colonel Megistu Haile Mariam, the head of state of Ethiopia 
ordered the Minister of Defense and other high military officials to fulfill the 1987 logistics 
support request of John Garang. The ministry of defense estimated the cost of Garang’s 
material requirements (the value of air lift and parachute not included): for ammunition 
Birr 74,438,875.00; weapons Birr 1,967,139.00; uniform Birr 2,707,700.00; vehicles & 
radios 3,178,012.00; total Birr 82,287,726.00.22 For the year 1987 the quantity of war 
materials dropped by parachute from Antonov planes and helicopters at different places 
and times in South Sudan was 15,694.35 quintals, which required 315 flights. The furthest 
area was located 740 kms. away from the border, while the closest lay 300 kms. distance 
from the border. According to the Minister of Defense the frequent air lift of the logistical 
materials deep into South Sudanese territories had a political risk for the government, who 
complained that ‘such decisions had to consider all political conditions, and the 
government could not fulfill all the requested weapons, ammunitions for small arms and 
uniforms’.23 
  
SPLA Military Progresses 
Once the leadership crisis in the SPLM/A was resolved, the primary task became the 
reorganization and arming of the remnants of Battalions 104 and 105 and the remaining 
elements of Anya Nya II, which now formed the nucleus of the SPLA. The first waves of 
recruits, mostly secondary school and university students and office workers were given 
intensive training at the Bonga camp and formed the Buffalo Battalion in 1983. The Jarad 
Division graduated in 1984, followed by the Mour Mour Division in 1985, the Kazuk in 
1986, the Zalzal in 1987, the Intifaddha in 1988 and the Intisar in 1989. These were big 
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divisions of SPLA composed of more than fifteen thousand men including officers, who 
graduated from the main SPLA training camp in Bonga and the auxiliary training camps in 
Belpam, Dimma, and Buma. Unlike in a normal army formation, the SPLA squads 
consisted of 17 men, a platoon consisted of 51, while a company comprised of 224, and a 
battalion consisted of 1344 men. The SPLA grew rapidly in numerical and military 
strength. By 1991 it was between 100,000 and 120,000 strong, almost the size of the 
Sudanese government armed forces, excluding the air force and the navy. The SPLA had 
engaged the Sudanese army and its militias and scored remarkable victories (Nyaba 1997: 
51). 
Nevertheless, the period between 1983 and 1985 was a most critical moment in the life 
of the SPLA. The major obstacle was the presence of the Anya Nya II forces along the 
Ethiopian borders where the SPLA had set up its camps. These forces made it very difficult 
for the SPLA forces to come back to the Sudan across the border. The Anya Nya II 
obstructed the SPLA’s attempts to carry out recruitment in Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal, 
and hundreds of thousands of recruits from these regions traveling to the training camps in 
the Gambella region of western Ethiopia were ambushed and massacred in 1984 and in 
1986 by the Anya Nya II forces. Further more, some segments of the Anya Nya II forces 
defected to the Khartoum government and formed a special unit in the army and continued 
to fight against the SPLA. Moreover, the bloody split of the Anya Nya II between 1983 and 
1988 which resulted in the loss of many lives was another challenge to the SPLA. The 
Anya Nya II split and the war with SPLA left deep scars among the people of south Sudan. 
The Anya Nya II split provoked a Dinka-Nuer ethnic animosity, which had serious 
repercussions for the civil population of the two groups in the Upper Nile. The split also 
adversely affected the development and military strategy of the SPLA. The split deprived 
the SPLA of the manpower it needed as the SPLA was depicted as a “Dinka movement” by 
the Nuer. This fit the propaganda of the Khartoum government which provided generous 
supplies of armaments to the Nuer forces in the Anya Nya II (Nyaba 1997: 16- 46). 
The earliest SPLA military impact was felt at the end of 1983 when the first few 
guerrillas trained in the bases in Gambella crossed the border and kidnapped nine French 
and Pakistani engineers working on the controversial Jonglei Canal for four days and 
which eventually brought the project to a halt. In the same year the SPLA forces invaded 
Malwal town and destroyed the garrison. The world media broadcasted the incident, which 
publicized the emergence and struggle of the SPLA against Numeiri regime.24 
The SPLA guerrillas mainly tried to inflict damage and capture equipment from the 
Sudanese army along the Sudan-Ethiopian border. In 1984 the SPLA began contacts with 
guerrilla units in distant areas such as Bentiu, Aweil, and Southern Kordofan. In these early 
days many recruits joined the SPLA not because of grievances with the North, but in order 
to get training and arms so that they could protect themselves from attacks of government 
militias organized among the Baqqara, Missiriya and Murle. The Bul Nuer took up arms to 
defend the Nuer against Missiriya incursions, and the Dinka recruits from northern Bahr al-
Ghazal defended their territory from the Baqqara raids. The Sudanese government strategy 
of organizing tribal militias which began under Numeiri continued under the successive 
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governments in Khartoum (Johnson 2003 69). The militia strategy was to serve as a 
propaganda argument that the war in the South was the outcome of internal Southern 
tribalism (ethnic conflict). It enabled successive Khartoum regimes and its international 
supporters even to deny that there was a civil war in the Sudan at all.  
By the end of 1985 the SPLA position inside the Sudan was strengthened by its 
capture of Boma, which became its headquarters, and its occupation of Yirol. Its important 
recruiting areas were the Upper Nile and Bahr al-Ghazal Regions. In Equatoria, the SPLA 
was by 1985 seen as a Dinka army and therefore had a few Equatorian recruits. Itang, 
Bonga, and Belpam in Gambella, in western Ethiopia remained the SPLA’s main supply 
and training bases. By 1985 the SPLA had attacked the garrisons of Malakal and Nasir and 
sunk boats carrying 400 army forces on the White Nile. The SPLA guerrilla unit from 
Gambella destroyed the Wau bridge in Bhar al-Gazal and mined the road which destroyed 
tanks and trucks with soldiers. This guerrilla unit returned to Ethiopia with 17,000 recruits 
for training. South of Malakal the SPLA inhibited the movement of the army with tanks, 
trucks, and boats and most areas were accessible only by plane. At this point, the Saudi 
government interfered by sending four C130 planes to the Numeiri government to meet the 
military problem in the south.25 
In 1985 and 1986 the army’s heavy-handedness upon the civilians for alleged support 
for the SPLA increased SPLA’s popularity throughout 1987 and 1988. In 1988 and 1989 
many groups of local militias defected to the SPLA side. The defection of a large number 
of the Anya Nya II forces in 1988 in the Upper Nile and Jonglei was the most significant.  
Another important development for the SPLA was the increase in the number of recruits 
throughout the South, which gradually removed the characterization of the SPLA as a 
Dinka army. The SPLA moved the war further north into the Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan 
and Darfur. In these areas the SPLA received the sympathy and support of the non-Arab 
local populations who suffered attacks from Arab militias such as the Murahalin and the 
Rufa’a (Johnson 2003: 83-4). 
 
SPLA Activities in Gambella 
The atrocities committed against innocent people by the Anya Nya II forces backed by the 
Khrtoum government, desertions from and defections to the SPLA, and the general state of 
lawlessness that existed in eastern and central Upper Nile between 1983 and 1988 
increased human rights abuses in the region. Cases of rape, murder, looting and burning of 
property and others were rampant and many of the crimes went unpunished. These crimes 
and chaotic conditions in the Upper Nile not only affected the south Sudanese, but also the 
Anuak and Nuer of Ethiopia in Gambela. According to Peter A. Nyaba, the SPLA recruits 
lacked political education and discipline and “Once they were deployed at the war front, 
their first victims became the unarmed civilians, whom they now terrorized, brutalized, 
raped, murdered and dehumanized.”( Nyaba 1997: 48-9) 
The Derg and the SPLA cooperated with one another and the entire Gambella region 
was under a kind of their joint administration. The SPLA administered the refugee camps 
and was in charge of security around the border areas. The refugee camps were 
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administered by committees consisting of ‘representatives’ of refugees, who were SPLA 
officers. The SPLA utilized relief goods intended for refugees to carry out its activities. 
The SPLA forces and the South Sudanese refugees enjoyed freedom of movement, while 
there were strict regulations imposed on the local communities of Gambella (Kurimoto 
2005:339-358). 
The presence of the SPLA in the region adversely affected every aspect of the life of 
the local population. The relation between the local Anuak and the SPLA was not friendly. 
The SPLA forces had committed considerable atrocities against the Anuak in some areas of 
Gambella. Theft, robbery, harassment, rape and killing by the heavily armed SPLA troops 
were common. In September 1989 the SPLA forces invaded the Anuak village of Pugnido, 
located along the Gilo River, near the refugee camp and, according to the elderly 
informants 120 Anuak were killed including women, children, the elderly and militias. The 
entire village was also burnt down. The attack was motivated in a revenge for the murder 
of a refugee by an Anuak. After four days the SPLA forces attacked Itang town and in the 
battle with the local militia near the refugee camp about 60 people were killed, 10 of them 
were SPLA men while the rest were the highlanders and the Anuak. In addition, the SPLA 
also killed about 14 people in Akado village near Itang town, where women and children 
were burnt in their tukul. According to the informants an unknown number of Anuak were 
killed by the SPLA in Gog-Jor district and were buried in mass graves.26 And all these 
crimes against the Anuak went unpunished. Another malicious action of the SPLA was 
their war on the people of Adini and Polkuni villages in Itang district, as the archives of the 
Ministry of Defense show: 
 
This conflict was provoked by the members of the SPLA. They took the offensive 
on Polkuini village   which they burnt. We came to understand that they forced 
the residents to flee across the river….The other SPLA segment which arrived 
from Mangog attacked Nor village and its inhabitants dispersed in the forest of 
the bank of the Baro river. They killed many people in launcher 
shelling….During the two battles many citizens were killed, 96 cattle were 
rustled, other properties taken…No food aid arrived for the people, so they are 
scattered to Jikawo and to unknown direction, houses and farms were burnt, 
households properties, sheep and goats, cows and calves had been driven to 
Berhane Selam by the SPLA….Unknown number of elders and children were 
killed.27 
 
In May 1989 a meeting of Brigadier General Merid Niguse, the Chief of Staff of the 
Ethiopian armed forces and the top officials of the western provinces of Wallaga, Kaffa 
and Illu Ababor concluded that despite some efforts, it was impossible to stop the ruthless 
actions of the SPLA. Even after four years of this report, the SPLA disciplinary situation 
did not show any improvement, as the archives of the same office indicate: 
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 Some undisciplined SPLA members rustled the cattle of our citizens and also 
commit other criminal activities which created hostility with the people. Despite 
some efforts by the regional administration and SPLA leaders to correct the 
situation, the plan did not work as desired.28 It is necessary to disclose some of 
the irresponsible activities of 07 (SPLA) members to the higher  authority so 
that its leadership may be  given warning.29 
 
According to an informant, David Oduro, the SPLA atrocities in Gambella could be 
attributed to the movement’s strong desire to enlist the Anuak in the movement which the 
Anuak strongly resisted. According to the informants the SPLM/A’s Anuak recruitment 
program and their involvement in the liberation struggle emanated apparently from the 
strategy of the movement to annex Gambella into the South Sudan and the iniquitous 
activities of the SPLA in Gambella were aimed at intimidation of the Anuak people in 
order to turn them to the movement.30 Even the armed officials of peasant associations 
resisted the misery and sufferings of the local communities by the SPLA, as the Gambella 
Regional Council archive states: 
 
There is an intelligence report that from Quatguar area seven chairmen of 
peasant associations robbed school and clinic properties and defected to the 
Sudan with the objective of getting arms and ammunitions from the Sudan 
(government) and coming back to attack the refugees/SPLA with the  people.31 
 
Part of the atrocities of the SPLA against the Anuak in many villages could also be 
attributed to revenge against the GPLM guerrillas who enjoyed the support of the local 
people and killed many SPLA forces in Gambella. While the SPLM/A in its struggle 
against the domination and oppression of the regimes in Khartoum was significantly using 
the Derg, the latter had used the SPLA as a proxy against the opposition to the regime. 
Moreover, the Derg might have hoped that the SPLM/A victory in Southern Sudan or its 
seizure of state power in the whole of the Sudan would bring security to Ethiopia by 
avoiding any dissident working against Ethiopia from the Sudan. 
 
 
The Ethio-Sudan Proxy Wars 
 
The hostile Ethio-Sudan relations during1974-80 could be explained primarily by the 
intensification of the internal conflicts in both countries and the involvement of the two 
countries in international Cold War rivalries in the sub-region. The Soviet Union supplied 
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arms to Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen, while the USA supported Egypt, Sudan and 
Somalia. After the downfall of Numeiri in 1985 there was an increasing support for the 
Eritreans in the Sudan. Western and Arab support for the Eritrean rebels also increased 
through cross-border aid organizations such as the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA) 
which was established in 1975 and operated from bases in the Sudan. (Woodward 2003: 
123) 
The 14th summit of the Leaders of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) set up a 
reconciliation committee consisting of seven countries to solve the conflict between the 
Sudanese and Ethiopian governments. The reconciliation committee met in Freetown in 
December 1977. On 18 June 1978 the foreign ministers of the two countries met in Dar es 
Salaam to talk on the improvement of Ethio-Sudan relations. In February 1979 the heads of 
state of the two countries came together through the mediation of Siaka Stevens, president 
of Sierra Leone and Chairman of the OAU at the time.32 
These developments were followed by new peace initiatives by the government of the 
Sudan. It involved the Ethiopian government for talks on bilateral trade relations and for a 
meeting of the joint Ethio-Sudanese Ministerial Consultative Commission in Addis Ababa. 
The request was accepted by the Ethiopian government, leading to some improvements in 
their relations. The December 1979 report of the Ethiopian ambassador to the Sudan 
referring to these changes indicated that there was a halt of the propaganda support that the 
president and the high officials of the country gave to the Eritrean rebel groups. The 
Sudanese media also stopped their pro-Eritrean rebel propaganda and began to report on 
the positive aspects of the emerging new relations between the two countries after the long 
hostility from 1975 to 1980.33 
In the process of rapprochement between the governments, the two heads of states, 
Mengistu H/ Mariam and Numeiri exchanged visits and signed an agreement to close 
insurgent offices in their countries, to expel the rebel leaders from their respective regions 
and to close their common border to prevent the crossing of rebels from either side. To 
implement this they agreed to establish the joint Ethio-Sudan Defense and Intelligence 
Committee. At the Ethio-Sudan talks on defense issues the military government of Ethiopia 
requested the Sudanese government to cooperate in permitting its armed forces to use the 
Sudanese territory in order to cut the supply lines of the EPLF in an attempt to bring the 
northern war to an end. The Ethio-Sudan Sub-Committee on defense met on 16 June 1982 
and agreed to consider ways and means of joint action regarding the prohibition of hostile 
activities directed against either country along the common border including air, ground 
and sea. This was in accordance with the provisions of the memorandum of understanding 
signed on 10 May 1982. The two governments agreed to exchange intelligence, instruct the 
military units and posts along the common border to prohibit any hostile penetration from 
either side, encouraging official contacts between the border posts to solve any local 
situation that might arise.34 
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In the emerging positive relations, Ethiopia demanded from the Sudanese government 
to use Sudanese territory to block the roads used by the Eritrean rebels to penetrate into the 
Sahel region, Eritrea, as the military report in the archive of the Ministry of Defense 
indicated:   
 
The strategy which would enable to defeat the rebels in the Sahel land is to 
block the communication lines from the Sudan to Eritrea and prevent the 
movement of  provisions, fuel, medicine, and in general logistics to the rebels, 
which will result in their dispersal from their trenches….35 
 
In the case of response from the Sudanese government to its demands, the military 
government of Ethiopia had designed operational plans to block and control passages of 
logistics from the Sudan for the Eritrean rebels. In cooperation with the Sudanese armed 
forces, the Derg planned to deploy Ethiopian ground forces at the Sudanese territories of 
Arkiko, Tokar and Mama, Jelhante and Tabah valley to block the communication lines and 
gates to Nakfa and Sala in Eritrea used by the EPLF forces. The final Derg strategy was to 
wipe out the rebels from the Sudanese territories and to close the common border. The 
Derg continued its pressing demands on the Sudanese government in vain: the Sudanese 
government gave different excuses at different times.36 Thus the process of rapprochement 
between the two countries was frustrated and both continued not only supporting rebels 
from their neighbors, but also using them as proxies against one another. 
 
The SPLA Attacks on the OLF and the GPLM 
The SPLA repaid the assistance from Ethiopia by fighting proxy wars for the Derg against 
the OLF (the Oromo Liberation Front) and the GPLM (the Gambella People’s Liberation 
Movement). Both movements were based in the Sudan and launched guerrilla wars against 
the Derg and SPLA from the Upper Nile and Blue Nile. The OLF which was founded in 
1974 carried out armed struggle from Hararge in the east, and opened the western front in 
western Wallaga in 1978 bordering the Sudan. The discontent of the Oromo elite group 
which formed the OLF was traced back to Menelik’s conquest of many territories of 
independent peoples, including the Oromo, in the south and south west in the early 1880s. 
Alien rule was imposed on the subjugated Oromo people who practiced the election of their 
own administrators through the gada system. The Oromo lost their ancestral land, most of 
which became “mengist” (state) land to be distributed at the will of the conquerors. Their 
labor was freely exploited by landlords. Occasionally they were expected to supply their 
landlords with fattened ox, ram, honey, butter, best grain and others. In addition, they paid 
the gibbir (taxes) and the tithes. (Baxter 1983: 133-4).  
Many Oromo who lived in fertile territories were also transformed from free farmers 
into poor share-cropping tenants.  Moreover, the Oromo were pressed to abandon their 
culture, tradition and religion in favor of the identity of the politically and economically 
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dominant group and were subjects rather than citizens of the Ethiopian empire. The 
subjugation and exploitation of the Oromo gave birth to the Oromo movement towards 
liberation. Until the final days of the imperial regime, the Oromo were denied any official 
status and were not allowed to publish, preach, teach or broadcast in their language. The 
important factors for the development of Oromo national consciousness were the 
consequences of the Imperial government’s own creation of a strong, centralized 
administration which ignored local differences in custom and culture and the imposition of 
its own culture. These developments increased resentment and promoted feelings of 
nationalism. (Ibid). 
In 1981 the headquarters of the OLF was 85 kilometers south of Kurmuk, along the 
bank of the Yabus river in the Sudan. Its camps and logistic stores were located at 
Kaburiya Yabus, Darsuma, Tasha, Camp 07 and Camp 08 in the Sudan. The OLF guerrillas 
carried out armed struggle against the Derg in Beni Shangul districts of Begi and Asosa, in 
Qellem districts of Gidami, Jimma Horro, Gawo Qebbe, Dalle Saddi, Dalle Wabarra, and 
Anfilo; and in Gimbi districts of Jarsso and Manasibu (Mandi). In some districts of Illu 
Ababor Region the OLF’s work was limited to propaganda and recruitment activities.37 
According to the military intelligence report, in western Ethiopia the OLF activities were a 
major problem comparable to what was happening in Eritrea and Tigray.  
 
It appears that the on-going anti-revolutionary movement in Wallega 
Administration Regional Administration is worsening from day to day and 
changing its character. When the OLF’s propaganda, recruitment and terrorist 
activities are closely assessed and evaluated, eventually the conditions that had 
been created in Eritrea and Tigrai would inevitably occur here.38 
 
The materials in the archive of the Ministry of National Defense reflected the growing 
anxiety of the military authorities over the unprecedented surge of the OLF in western 
Ethiopia. One memo stated: “It is necessary to provide the required logistic support to the 
SPLA and in a coordinated operation with our armed forces to destroy the OLF camps in 
the Sudan.”39 
In the early 1980s both the OLF and GPLM were supported by the Sudanese army. 
The Khartoum government was well aware of the hostility between the SPLA and the 
Anuak of Gambella. The SPLA had frequently attacked OLF and GPLM camps, both in 
Ethiopia and the Sudan (Johnson 2001: 87-9; 2003:8). The GPLM was the movement of 
the Anuak of Gambella which had been formed under the Sudanese patronage in 1980 
primarily by young Anuak fleeing conscription into peasant militias to fight in the northern 
war in the late 1970s. Another grievance of the Anuak was the increasing incorporation of 
Nuer into the local administration by the Derg. Moreover, the Anuak felt displaced from 
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their ancestral territories by the highland resettlement schemes and the Nuer settlement in 
Gambella since the inception of the civil war in southern Sudan in 1955. The Khartoum 
government was well aware of the bitter hostility between the SPLA and the Anuak of 
Gambella: ‘the Sudanese government gave special consideration in embracing the Anuak 
to get intelligence information and eliminate the SPLA movement’.40 The research on the 
ethnic groups of Gambella by the army officer in charge of the SPLA shows Derg’s 
repugnance for the Anuak.41 
On 24 March 1987 the GPLM guerrillas infiltrated into Gambella district from Anfillo 
district of Qellem and invaded the Baro Abol Resettlement Camp killing five settlers and 
burnt crops, fertilizers and some houses. On 2 April 1987 they ambushed workers who 
were engaged in road construction and killed six of them and took away five workers. On 
23 March 1987 the GPLM forces attacked the police and the militia at Jor district killing 
fifteen of them. In the meantime from 7 February 1987 for a continuous 47 days the SPLA 
carried out relentless attacks against the Sudanese forces in an attempt to capture the 
Sudanese Jikawo. However, the heavily armed Sudanese reinforcement forces arrived and 
forced the SPLA guerrillas to retreat to Gambella. The Sudanese army crossed the border 
in pursuit of the SPLA forces and destroyed the Ethiopian Jikawo town and the police 
station. The Sudanese forces penetrated 15 kms. deep into Gambella and pillaged whatever 
property they could take and burnt down the rest.42 
In Gambella, for the first time the Ethiopian army and the SPLA combined their forces 
and liberated the Ethiopian Jikawo from the Sudanese army. As the archives of the 
Ministry of National Defense reveals: “Based on the order given from the higher authority, 
the Ethiopian Jikawo was liberated after the fighting on 18 April 1987, and under the 
leadership of John Garang, the commander of the SPLA, in an astonishing coordination 
and leadership after five days of fighting the Sudanese Jikawo was captured on April 22, 
1987.”43  
The SPLA fought along with the Ethiopian army against the large-scale EPLF-OLF 
invasion of Asossa in 1990 and against the Sudanese forces which frequently attacked the 
Ethiopian Akobo and other border districts in the Gambella region. On the other side, the 
Ethiopian army had been accused by the Sudanese government for involvement in the brief 
capture of the northern Sudanese towns of Kurmuk and Geissan by the SPLA in 1987 
(James 2007: 53). 
The SPLA’s military success against the OLF at the beginning of 1985 brought it 
almost unlimited military and logistical support from the Derg regime and cemented the 
personal alliance between Colonel Mengistu and John Garang. The SPLA dislodged the 
OLF forces and destroyed their camps in areas known as Daga, Pant and Zakor in Southern 
Blue Nile. The OLF forces reorganized and consolidated themselves in a region called 
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Tasha in Begi district in western Wallaga. From Tasha the OLF infiltrated into Begi and 
succeeded in getting the support of the local population, and 562 leaders of mass 
organizations had joined it. The OLF also successfully cut Begi’s economic, social and 
administrative links with Asossa town. The SPLA provided all the necessary intelligence 
information about the OLF to the Derg authorities and by the end of June 1985 participated 
in the battle of Tasha against the OLF. During the fighting 250 houses, 150 small market 
shops, seven peasant association offices with their halls, ten peasant villages, two big stores 
and the main camp of the OLF with ammunitions and provisions were completely 
destroyed. The SPLA had played a great role in the victory over the OLF which retreated 
and set up its camp at Giessan in the north.44 
  
The 1989-90 EPLF-OLF Invasion of Asossa 
The Sudanese army had also supported the 1989-90 EPLF-OLF invasion and prolonged 
occupation of Assosa. The Archives of the Ministry of National Defense stated: 
 
From January 24, 1990 onwards, our army stationed at Agobela, Kurmuk, 
Giessan and Qotta Warqe, quit communication and it is also impossible to make 
radio communication through the Police and the SPLA. The simultaneous 
attacks on the Ethiopian Kurmuk and Angobela were beyond the capacity of our 
army which led to its disarray. The invaders were the EPLF and OLF forces, 
and the EPLF constituted the larger number. Both used our army uniforms. The 
Sudanese army had participated in the attacks on Kurmuk and Qotta Warqe45. 
 
The coordinated EPLF-OLF invasion of Asossa was organized by the Sudanese army 
and the EPLF in Demazin. In its efforts to weaken the Derg, expand the war and support 
opposition to the Derg, the EPLF moved south and captured Beni Shangul. It left the 
territory to the OLF which was assumed to have local popular support and ethnic affinity 
with the local people. The OLF could only hold Beni Shangul for two months and before it 
retreated it destroyed the local power station, the hospital, and took valuable items that it 
could carry away (Young 1999:327). 
The border towns of Kurmuk and Giessan and Agobela village were occupied by the 
rebels supported by the Sudanese army. From Agobela the EPLF-OLF forces marched to 
Asossa town which they controlled on 5 January 1990. The EPLF-OLF coalition forces 
were engaged in heavy fighting against the ‘Fourth Revolutionary Army’ of Ethiopia at 
Tsore, where the Uduk refugee camp and SPLA training base was located and at the 
Mountain of Arsis, on the entrance of the town. The invading forces marched further to the 
interior and controlled the town of Bambasi and at the bridge of the Dabus river hand to 
hand combat took place which resulted in heavy loss of life from both sides. The bridge 
was destroyed and the Ethiopian army retreated to Mendi (Manasibu) district, found at 
about 230 kms. from Kurmuk. In Mendi the rebels destroyed the Dalati Ethio-Libyan 
Marble industry. The intention of the assistance of Sudanese army for the rebels was to 
                                                 
44MOD, .438, No.3///22/6/008/77, 02/11/1977.  
45MOD, .344, ZS4 10//ZT2/1702/82, Report of Fourth Army Division, December 13,1990.  
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dislodge the SPLA from Kurmuk, which was captured in September 1989. The Sudanese 
government also planned the destruction of the Tsore refugee camp and the SPLA military 
training camps found in the region. During the EPLF-OLF attacks in the Asossa area, the 
SPLA had about 4000-6000 forces at its training camps of Giessan, Qotta Warke, Jebel Dul 
and Camp No.47. The SPLA forces and thousands of refugees from the Blue Nile left 
Asossa through Megele and Shirkole to Gambella.  Asossa town was occupied from 5 
January 1990 to 3 February 1990 by the OLF forces.46  
By the time the government reorganized the dispersed forces to take an offensive 
through ‘Zemecha Tireg’, literally, ‘Operation Wipe Out/Eliminate’; the rebels had 
already left Asossa to the Sudanese border. The Ethiopian government could not deploy 
sufficient forces to secure the Asossa front which experienced unprecedented large-scale 
invasion because of heavy military engagement against the EPLF in the north and against 
the fast advancing and successful military operations of the EPRDF forces in the central 
provinces. John Garang’s 5 January 1991 logistical requests to the Derg showed that the 
Sudanese government had massed troops in Malakal, including two Brigades of various 
Ethiopian rebel groups (OLF, EPLF, GLF (GPLM) etc.) for eventual attacks on Gambella 
and Itang.47 The Ethiopian military authorities not only gave a prompt response to Garang’s 
logistics request by supplying arms, ammunition, communication radios and provision, but 
also made preparations for military support to the SPLA. The Ethiopian army occupied 
strategic points on the Ethio-Sudan border and Lt. General Addis Tedla, the General Chief 
of Staff of the armed forces ordered the Ethiopian Air Force to provide air support for the 
movement.48 
According to the military report, large attacks were planned on Gambella from two 
directions by the OLF-GPLM forces. The desperate situation compelled the Ethiopian 
military authorities to press on the SPLA to participate in the intensifying wars against the 
opposition movements. Nevertheless, the SPLA chief in Addis Ababa was requested by the 
Ethiopian officials to contribute to the intensification of fighting against the opposition 
movements. Amidst the increasing military operation, the Derg government continued 
urgent logistic supplies for the SPLA49. The 1990s intensified attacks from the different 
regions of the country had brought about alarming challenges of unprecedented proportion 
in the military, political and diplomatic fronts for the military regime of Ethiopia, which 
eventually led to its demise. The collapse of the Derg was immediately followed by the 
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In the1990s the Horn of Africa region witnessed multiple dramatic events including: the 
EPRDF seizure of power in Ethiopia toppling the Derg government, the fall of Siyad Barre 
in Somalia and the collapse of the state, the emergence of Eritrea as an independent state, 
SPLA’s sudden withdrawal from Ethiopia, the evacuation of thousands of Southern 
Sudanese refugees from southwestern Ethiopia, and the inauguration of new friendly 
relations between the EPRDF and the Sudanese government. The year 1991 also marked 
the end of the Cold War and a radical change of perspectives in Western countries on the 
developing countries with consequences for the regional political configuration of the Horn 
of Africa. 
After 1991 the pattern of conflict along the Ethiopian border territories, especially in 
the Gambella region assumed a new phase. The Anuak and the Nuer comprise the two 
largest ethnic groups of Gambella  and they dominate the politics of the Gambella Regional 
State. The post-1991 political process of the region was shaped by the social interaction 
and political relations between the two traditional enemies, the Anuak and the Nuer. On 16 
May 1991 the combined forces of the EPRDF and GPLM drove out the Nuer Derg officials 
of Gambella and the SPLA forces. The alliance between the EPRDF and the GPLM during 
the armed struggle enabled the Anuak to take control of the Gambella region. 
The new federal administrative arrangement transformed Gambella from frontier 
district into a regional state, the 'Gambella People’s National Regional State' (GPNRS). 
The Gambella Regional State is one of the nine regional states of the Federal Republic of 
Ethiopia. After the establishment of the Gambella Regional State and the rise of new power 
structure new patterns of relations emerged between the Anuak and the Nuer. There were 
disagreements over the level of representation of the two ethnic groups in higher offices of 
the region. Issues related to sharing of resources also complicated relations between them ( 
Asnake 2004). The magnitude of the Anuak-Nuer conflict indicated the past hostilities, 
issues of political representation and competition over the resources of the region. The 
Regional Government of Gambella was dominated by the GPLM, the Anuak organization 
which claimed that Gambella was an Anuak land. The new Anuak rulers accused the Nuer 
for designing the atrocities committed against the Anuak community by the SPLM/A. In 
the June 1992 election for the Regional State Council of Gambella, among the twelve 
Council members seven were Anuak and there were no Nuer elect to the Regional Council, 
as elections did not take place in the Nuer districts of Akobo, Jikawo and Itang because of 
security reaons. Therefore, the Anuak-GPLM dominated the Regional Council, and the 
majority of appointed vice-ministers of the Regional Government were also the Anuak 
(Dereje 2002).     
Eventually the Anuak took over the political offices and administrative posts. The 
presidency and other higher positions in the regional council were reserved for the Anuak 
which reflected the Anuak domination. The pattern of power distribution remained that an 
Anuak president, a Nuer vice-president, and a Majenger secretary. The Anuak dominance 
was revealed in their higher representation in the council and employment opportunities in 
the emerging regional bureaucracy. In 1992 out of 20 regional ministers there were 15 
Anuak, 3 Nuer, 1 Majenger and 1 Komo. After a decade, out of 18 ministers there were 11 
Anuak, 6 Nuer and 1 Komo (Goma). (Dereje 2006)  
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The Anuak political dominance was contested by the Nuer who constituted the 
subordinate political status in the regional politics. In 2003 the Anuak-Nuer deadly conflict 
called for the intervention of the federal government. The federal government introduced a 
new power-sharing arrangement through ethnic-based zonal administration which created 
an equitable representation and a greater inclusion of the Nuer in the regional politics. The 
Anuak politicians, however, considered the new power sharing as a threat to their 
dominance. The Anuak-Nuer violent conflict eventually subsided by the late 2003, but a 
relative peace in Gambella was very brief as ethnic conflict between the Anuak and the 
highland communities of the region was emerging which culminated in the 13 December 
2003 massacre of the Anuak. The various groups in Gambella could not emerge as partners 
but competed for political power and engaged in conflicting strategies of ethnic entitlement 
which generated violent conflicts. The federal experiment in the GPNRS exhibited serious 
challenges, and Dereje had this reaction to the process, “…Ironically, a policy which was 
hailed as a means of promoting inter-group harmony has resulted in just the opposite.” 
(Dereje 2002:24) 
The continued mutual and reciprocal harbouring and supporting of opposition 
insurgent groups fighting to overthrow their respective governments had adversely affected 
relations between the Sudan and Ethiopia. The TPLF had enjoyed strong backing from both 
Numeiri and Al-Bashir regimes during its armed struggle against the Derg as a counter 
balance for the generous military and logistical support the latter  provided to the SPLM/A. 
When the EPRDF seized power the National Islamic Front (NIF) government believed that 
a greater opportunity was created to wipe out the SPLA. On the other hand, the EPRDF 
was eager to establish friendly relations with the Sudan as a positive gesture to pay back 
what it owed the country.  In 1992 Ethiopia and the Sudan signed a friendship agreement 
which included the opening up of their boundaries for the free movement of people and 
goods. The two countries also agreed to expel opposition groups operating in their 
territories. This agreement was very important for both governments because it would 
deprive the SPLM/A of any future assistance from Ethiopia which would provide a good 
opportunity for the NIF government to gain the upper hand in the war in Southern Sudan. 
With regard to Ethiopia, the agreement could avoid the involvement of the Sudan in 
assisting any insurgent movement that might threaten the young EPRDF regime. This was 
evident in the withdrawal of the OLF from the Transitional Government in opposition to 
the 20 June 1992 local elections which made the Ethiopian government committed to 
maintain its friendly ties with the Sudan. It was also at this time that the Ethiopian 
government allowed the opening of the Sudanese government consulates in Gambella and 
Assosa towns. (Molla 2002:28) 
New conflicts are predicted in Gambella with the beginning of oil exploration in the 
region after the agreement between the federal government of Ethiopia and Petronas, a 
Malaysian based company. This company also exploits oil fields in southern Sudan. While 
the exploration is underway, different ethnic and political groups have already claimed 
rights and access to exploring and benefiting from the natural resources. Under the title “To 
whom does Ethiopia’s Gambella oil belong? the Sudan Tribune recorded that “Gambella is 
an extension of the Mulet basin, located in south Sudan, and is known for its huge amount 
of oil reserve.” (Sudan Tribune 2006) One of the outstanding issues in the Comprehensive 
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Peace Agreement between the Government of the Sudan an the SPLM/A on 9 January 
2005 was the referendum of 2011 in southern Sudan for unity or independence, which 
brought the long civil war to an end. A survey recently conducted in most parts of southern 
Sudan indicated that over 90% southern Sudanese interviewed said they would vote for 
independent south Sudan. However, the National Congress Party (NCP) put many 
obstacles against the referendum. (David Nailo Majo 2009). Nevertheless, an independent 
south Sudan would be perceived as a potential threat to other countries dependent on the 
waters of the Nile, particularly Egypt. Confrontation also may occur between independent 
south Sudan and the Gambella Regional State which is undertaking irrigation schemes in 
the Baro-Akobo basin, which may complicate regional politics. A civil war in the south is 
projected if problems between the north and south are not resolved prior to the referendum. 
This would reverse the relative peace of the Gambella region as civil war in southern 
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